A pressing need for war

By Mark Alexander · Friday, September 20, 2002

As predictable as he is ruthless, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein has agreed this week to the readmission of UN weapons inspectors -- in an effort to buy his regime a few more months. This amounts to a very dangerous endgame and the price could be incalculable, but President George Bush has determined that it is in our national interest to proceed on this course, we estimate, because intelligence from inspectors on the ground in Iraq will be very useful. The U.S. policy of regime change is as concrete as ever, and according to congressional testimony from Secretaries Don Rumsfeld and Colin Powell, more pressing than ever. On the heels of his victory in the UN, President Bush presented Congress this week with a resolution to deal with Saddam, and Democrats in both houses are finally falling in line with the administration, fearing the political consequences of dissension.

Inspectors Return in October -- In a letter delivered to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the government of Iraq agreed to the unconditional return of UN weapons inspectors to their country, basing its decision "on its desire to complete the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and to remove any doubts that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction." This change comes amid heightened pressure from the UN, Iraq's Russian and Arab allies and Saudi Arabia opening its air bases for a U.S.-led military action against the rogue state. Likely anticipating such a response to President Bush's UN address last week, the White House immediately labeled the move "a tactical step by Iraq in hopes of avoiding strong UN Security Council action." This latest ploy by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein is doubtless intended to divide the Security Council -- not to mention growing bipartisan resolve within the United States -- on the question of a military response to Iraq.

In his address to the UN, President Bush wisely elected not to mention the stated U.S. policy of regime change in Iraq, instead focusing his remarks on the 16 UN resolutions with which Iraq has failed to comply. The genius of the president's approach is that he placed the burden of Iraqi compliance on the UN itself, confronting the body with the inevitable choice of vindicating its own authority, or else be relegated to irrelevance, a la the League of Nations. By avoiding the subject of regime change, Mr. Bush permitted many European and Arab nations the umbrella they need (the necessity of enforcing multilateral resolutions) to achieve what they all really want but cannot voice -- the removal of Saddam Hussein. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reiterated, "There are a number of countries afraid of Saddam Hussein" and hence reluctant to voice public support for action against him. As The Federalist has noted, the Saudis and many EU-niks rightly consider themselves among the first to suffer should they publicly support the U.S.

Regarding Saddam's sincerity, in the 48 hours following their agreement to readmit weapons inspectors, Iraq fired on coalition aircraft patrolling the northern and southern no-fly zones 6 times -- on top of 2,300 other such incidents over the past two-and-a-half years.

A Pressing Need for War -- "The United Nations Security Council must show backbone, must step up and hold this regime to account," President Bush declared. "Otherwise, the United States and some of our friends will do so." And on that note, Mr. Bush sent to congress a draft for a war powers resolution stating: "The president, is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region." Of his resolution, the president said, "This is a chance for Congress to indicate support ... to send a clear message that we expect Saddam to disarm." Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee this week, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld continued to make the case for quick action against Iraq, directly linking Saddam Hussein's dictatorship with imminent terrorist threats in the United States. "We are on notice. An attack very likely will be attempted. The only question is when and by what technique, could be months could be years, but it will happen," Secretary Rumsfeld warned. "If it were to happen today, none of us would be able to say that it was a surprise."

Essentially denying the security value of continued weapons inspection, and cornering congressional obstructionist and political detractors, Rumsfeld concluded, "It is important that Congress send that message as soon as possible -- before the UN Security Council votes. Do you believe it is our responsibility to wait for a nuclear, chemical or biological September 11? Or is it the responsibility of free people to do something now -- to take steps to deal with the threat before we are attacked? If someone is waiting for a so-called smoking gun, it's certain we will have waited too long. ... The goal must be to stop Saddam Hussein before he fires a weapon of mass destruction against our people. ... No other living dictator matches Saddam Hussein's record of waging aggressive war against his neighbors, pursuing weapons of mass destruction, using them against his own people, launching missiles against his neighbors, brutalizing and torturing his own citizens, harboring terrorist networks, engaging in terrorist acts, including the attempted assassination of foreign officials, violating international commitments, lying and hiding his WMD programs from inspectors, deceiving and defying the expressed will of the United Nations over and over again."

On the subject of "symmetric" versus "asymmetric" warfare, as explicated in Federalist No. 02-36 last week, Mr. Rumsfeld noted in testimony this week: "Some have argued that Iraq is unlikely to use weapons of mass destruction against us because, unlike terrorist, networks Saddam Hussein has a return address; that is to say he's probably deterrable, is the argument. Well, there's no reason for confidence that if Iraq launched a WMD attack on the U.S. that it would necessarily have an obvious return of address. There are ways Iraq can easily conceal responsibility for a WMD attack. For example, they could give biological weapons to terrorist networks to attack the United States from within and then deny any knowledge. Suicide bombers are not deterrable." Precisely our point, and, indeed, our prosecution of the war with Jihadistan is not about symmetric warfare between standing armies of nation states but about detection and interdiction (preemption) of attacks carried out by terrorists -- surrogate or asymmetric warfare.

"Good Cop" Turns "Bad Cop" -- The U.S., however, is in a position to publicly voice its policy of regime change, as a separate issue from unconditional weapons inspections. Secretary of State Colin Powell, often playing the part of the chief obstruction to the administration's Iraq war policy, was the first to reiterate "regime change" as the official U.S. stance toward Iraq. Mr. Powell furthermore says that the UN has "a matter of weeks, not months" to draft and pass a tough new resolution or series of resolutions giving Saddam a non-negotiable deadline for compliance. "...[Iraq] convicted itself by its action over the last 12 years. There can be no question that Iraq is in material breech of its obligations," Mr. Powell remarked before the House International Relations Committee, citing President Bush's damning indictment before the UN, and adding that Iraq must face the inevitable consequences if it continues in its failure to comply with UN resolutions on disarmament.

Hawks and Doves -- Saddam's move to readmit weapons inspectors in hope of dividing U.S. resolve for an attack on Iraq is a decent gamble. (Saddam knows that Leftists are spineless.) For Democrats on the Left, U.S. policy on Iraq is totally dependent on the winds of political change. In 1998, every frontline Democrat in both houses of Congress supported tough action against Iraq, even when the nature of the Iraqi threat was far more ambiguous than it is today. Fast-forward to the present, and the very same Democrats are having trouble warming up to the idea of war. What changed? In 1998, legacy-builder-in-chief Bill Clinton was facing a House impeachment; today Democrats are facing midterm elections where support or opposition to war could cost their fragile hold on the Senate. If Democrats support the president in a war leading up to the elections, members of Congress representing more sissified, make-love-not-war districts face ruin; if they oppose a war, Democrats in more evenly divided districts don't stand a prayer while 80% of the public supports the military option.

Up to this week, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle couldn't stop saying that President Bush has yet to convince him of the need for military action: "What has changed in recent months or years [to attack Iraq now]?" In 1998, however, Mr. Daschle co-sponsored a war resolution urging Mr. Clinton "to take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs." That resolution was co-sponsored by other Democrats who now compose Mr. Bush's most vocal critics, including Sens. Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, John Kerry of Massachusetts and Robert Byrd of West Virginia.

"I agree with using military force," Sen. Dodd confidently voiced on Feb. 3, 1998. Now, however, Mr. Bush's plan for military action "raises some red flags," said Dodd. On Feb. 23, 1998, Sen. Kerry warned that Iraq's weapons buildup was "a threat to the stability of the Middle East. It is a threat with respect to the potential activities on a global basis." In his Sept. 6, 2002 op-ed in the New York Times, however, Kerry decides that "regime change by itself is not a justification for going to war." On Nov. 14, 1998, the venerable Sen. Robert C. Byrd, whose martial experience predates the American Civil War, said, "The U.S. should strike, strike hard and strike decisively. In this instance, the administration needs to act sooner rather than later." Last week, Sen. Byrd sagaciously opined, "We stand today in the swirl of unanswered questions about this administration's intent with regard to an unprovoked, preemptive attack against the sovereign nation of Iraq." As the ravages of age take their toll, Sen. Byrd seems to have forgotten the answer that presented itself with such lucidity in 1998. But on Wednesday, most congressional Democrats got religion, removing their objections to a possible military action against Iraq prior to the November elections. Of course, the usual cadre of congressional socialists have linked arms to fight the Bush draft, led by the Lee "sisters" (Barbara and Sheila Jackson), et al. But Republican Sen. John McCain now anticipates 70 to 75 votes in support of such a measure in the Senate.

A Swift Victory -- As a seemingly inevitable military conflict with Iraq appears to draw ever nearer, key officials anticipate a relatively swift victory, similar to the 100-hour ground war of Desert Storm in 1991. "I don't think it would be that tough a fight," noted Vice President Cheney. "That is, I don't think there's any question that we would prevail and we would achieve our objective." The objective, clearly, is WMD disarmament and regime change that is ideological -- not simply exchanging the villain we know for the villain we don't know. And the desire for ideological regime change is evident not only in the West, but within the Iraqi military itself. Intelligence reports estimate anywhere from 3 to 5 attempted military coups during the 1990s. Reflecting the administration's belief that many Iraqi commanders and their units will either refuse to fight or else join U.S. and allied forces in overturning Saddam, Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, remarked, "I don't believe we have to defeat Saddam's army -- I think Saddam's army will defeat Saddam."

And concerning the state of the Iraqi military, "Iraq is much weaker than they were back in the early '90s," according to Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Richard B. Myers. Iraq's military has only deteriorated since 1991, with a standing army of 424,000 -- formidable, though less than half the force faced in the Gulf War. Furthermore, the Iraqis have already demonstrated an inability to utilize surface-to-air missiles in their contacts with U.S. and British fighters patrolling the northern and southern no-fly zones, and it is estimated that 50% of Iraq's military hardware lacks sufficient spare parts to remain operational. In the devastating air campaign of Desert Storm, only 10% of the ordnance used were "smart bombs" -- precision-guided munitions. It is estimated that in an air campaign against Iraq today, perhaps 80% of munitions employed would be precision-guided -- and these improved weapons are far smarter than their 1991 counterparts.

Finally, the Ritter Pseudomorph -- Scott Ritter, the former weapons inspector who resigned under protest in August of 1998 claiming that the Clinton regime did not take the threat of Iraq's nuclear weapons program seriously, is making the talk show rounds, now claiming Iraq is not a WMD threat to the U.S. The Federalist covered Ritter's complaints against Clinton extensively, both prior to and after his resignation, and his "conversion" has puzzled us as it has most of our readers. Consulting our staff psychologist for an explanation, the best diagnosis that we can muster is that Ritter is suffering from Stockholm Syndrome by Proxy, a condition that has left him certifiably committable. Having spent significant time on the ground in Iraq, Ritter empathizes with the Iraqi people, who, to stay alive, must be adherents of Saddam's regime. Thus, he is now, by proxy, subject to the same demented logic that compels the Iraqi people to fear the "Butcher of Baghdad." Supporting this diagnosis, Ritter was paid $400,000 by Iraqi operatives to make a documentary detailing how the Iraqi people are suffering under UN sanctions.