When President Donald Trump launched military operations against Iran in February, many conservatives agreed with the administration’s objective of ensuring Iran could never acquire a nuclear weapon. Still, the administration struggled to answer a fundamental question: Why was another war necessary?

Just eight months earlier, Operation Midnight Hammer had struck Iran’s most important nuclear facilities, which Trump subsequently described as completely obliterated. If the operation was as successful as the administration claimed, why did the United States need to attack Iran again?

A legitimate explanation existed, but the administration did a poor job communicating it to the American people. Following Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran understood that rebuilding its nuclear program would accomplish little if the United States could simply destroy it again. The regime needed to develop the military capabilities necessary to prevent another American operation.

Iran subsequently accelerated the rebuilding of its ballistic missile infrastructure. The significance of those missiles extended well beyond their ability to strike Israel or American allies in the Persian Gulf. A sufficiently powerful missile arsenal could make another operation like Midnight Hammer considerably more costly, effectively providing Iran with a shield behind which it could develop a nuclear weapon.

That was one of the most compelling reasons for the urgency behind the February strikes. Yet much of the administration’s messaging remained focused on the broad objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, without adequately explaining what had changed since June. The messaging became even more complicated when the administration agreed to a ceasefire in April. If Iran posed such an immediate threat that military action was necessary in February, Americans understandably questioned why the United States was willing to suspend operations just weeks later.

Throughout the conflict, Iran demonstrated that its ability to threaten American interests did not depend on having a formidable navy or air force. By threatening commercial vessels and disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the regime demonstrated how relatively limited military capabilities could impose enormous economic costs on the rest of the world.

That brings us to the real reason the war has become so unpopular. If the United States could ensure through a single day of military operations that Iran would never acquire a nuclear weapon, I suspect an overwhelming majority of Americans would support it, even though it would still be an interventionist policy. The opposition stems largely from the price Americans are being asked to pay to achieve the war’s objectives, not from a belief that those objectives are unworthy.

If we acknowledge that Iran poses a genuine threat to American interests, we must also acknowledge that eliminating that threat may come at a cost. The question is whether the cost of confronting Iran today exceeds the cost of allowing the regime to grow stronger tomorrow.

With the midterms behind him, Trump has a limited window before a Democrat-controlled Congress takes office in January. Iran understands that the new Congress could significantly restrict the administration’s ability to continue military operations, giving the regime another incentive to prolong negotiations.

Fortunately, some of the administration’s greatest leverage today may be economic. American sanctions and restrictions on Iranian oil exports have placed considerable pressure on the regime. As winter approaches, Iran will also face growing domestic pressures stemming from energy shortages, inflation, and a prolonged water crisis. The administration should capitalize on these vulnerabilities while maintaining the military pressure necessary to prevent Iran from rebuilding its capabilities. This does not mean prolonging the war indefinitely. Had the United States maintained its military momentum in April, it might not be relying so heavily on economic pressure today.

Even Americans who opposed the decision to go to war should recognize the consequences of ending it on unfavorable terms. A deal that allows Iran to rebuild its missile arsenal or establish the ability to charge vessels for passage through the Strait of Hormuz would significantly strengthen Tehran’s regional position.

As Americans learned from Afghanistan, the cost of a poorly managed end to a war extends well beyond the immediate financial savings. It undermines American credibility and encourages our adversaries to test the limits of our resolve. Americans have already paid a considerable price for the war with Iran. The Trump administration cannot afford to secure a deal that leaves us paying an even greater price for years to come.