The Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran has already created a divide on the Right. Some are celebrating it as the end of a war they viewed as un-American from the start. Others warn that it looks like the Obama Nuclear Deal 2.0: vague promises, temporary restraint, and economic benefits flowing back to Tehran.

The critics are not wrong to be concerned. On paper, this is not a strong agreement. Iran is not being forced into permanent submission, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz will inevitably benefit Iran financially, even if the U.S. and the global economy also benefit from stabilized energy markets. Reports indicate that the arrangement initiates a 60-day negotiation period and places heavy emphasis on keeping the Strait of Hormuz open.

But that is exactly the point: this is a 60-day memorandum of understanding. It is not a treaty or a permanent peace deal.

A deal that merely asks Iran to behave while giving it breathing room would be a disaster. America has already seen what happens when Washington treats Iranian promises as if they are Iranian concessions. The Obama administration’s approach empowered Tehran by assuming that diplomatic paperwork could substitute for actual deterrence.

President Donald Trump cannot allow that mistake to define his own presidency. But the difference between Trump and other presidents who attempted to tame Iran is that he knows it.

The more realistic reading of this MOU is not that Trump has suddenly decided to trust Iran. It is that he is buying time to calm markets and prevent a temporary military victory from becoming a domestic economic crisis. Trump still has a country to run. He has to care about energy prices, shipping lanes, inflation, and internal political unity.

The immediate threat from Iran has been significantly weakened. That does not mean the job is finished. Iran should never again be allowed to rebuild its nuclear infrastructure, expand its ballistic missile program, or use negotiations as a shield while it regroups. The regime has spent decades proving that it cannot be trusted.

But Trump’s foreign policy has never been built on trust. It has always been based on leverage.

That is why the next 60 days matter far more than the MOU itself. Iran will almost certainly try to stretch negotiations, extract concessions, and present itself as the reasonable party while preserving as much of its power as possible. That is what regimes like this do. But Trump will not let them get away with it. He will not let the regime “play” the United States. After all, Trump governs by the motto “FAFO.”

At the end of the day, this comes down to whether you trust Trump’s judgment. Not in the sense of blind loyalty, but in recognizing that Trump understands something the foreign policy establishment often forgets: negotiating with hostile regimes only works when they believe the consequences of defiance will be worse than the concessions of compliance.

Out of all the criticism that can be directed at this deal, one thing is undeniably clear: it is not the deal Israel would have written itself. This agreement does not primarily benefit Israel, nor is it the strongest arrangement from Israel’s perspective.

If there is one thing this deal demonstrates, it is that President Trump is very clearly not governed by Israel. He is governed by his own judgment. Anyone who continues to claim that Israel controls Donald Trump — or that Israel exercises some overriding influence over American policymaking — has a much harder case to make after this agreement.

Donald Trump has been Israel’s strongest ally in the White House, but being an ally does not mean being controlled. In fact, allies are rarely in complete agreement. If the United States and Israel were perfectly aligned on every issue, they would effectively be the same country. Israel and the United States are sovereign nations with their own interests, priorities, and political realities.

This MOU serves as a reminder that President Trump’s actions are guided by what he believes best serves American interests. Sometimes those interests are immediate, sometimes they are temporary, and sometimes they are long-term. It is the president’s responsibility, as commander-in-chief, to determine when it is necessary to accept political unpopularity for the greater good of the country and when it is necessary to preserve stability and protect the nation’s current interests.

The success or failure of this agreement will ultimately depend not on the memorandum itself, but on what follows during the negotiations that come next.