Debates over Greenland’s importance are often dismissed as exaggerated or irrational, as if concern about the island reflects outdated Cold War thinking. That assumption avoids the core reality. Greenland matters not because of political symbolism or hypothetical conflict, but because modern military defense, global supply chains, and great-power competition already depend on the Arctic.

Control over Greenland shapes outcomes that the United States cannot afford to outsource, and every major strategic indicator points in the same direction.

Greenland sits directly between North America and Europe, adjacent to the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap. That corridor has been a primary transit route for Russian naval forces entering the Atlantic since World War II.

Geography has not changed. What has changed is Russia’s capacity. The Northern Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula, operates most of Russia’s nuclear-armed submarines, and NATO assessments show that this fleet has been systematically modernized with greater stealth, under-ice maneuverability, and long-range strike capability.

Any submarine traveling from Murmansk (a crucial military hub for Russia’s Northern Fleet) to the Atlantic must pass waters where Greenland provides early detection and monitoring advantages.

Missile defense makes Greenland even more central. The United States operates Pituffik Space Base in northwest Greenland, hosting early-warning radar integrated into the U.S. ballistic missile defense system. Intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from Russia or the Arctic region follow polar trajectories.

Radar coverage from Greenland provides detection time that no continental U.S. installation can replace. Satellites supplement warning systems but do not eliminate the need for ground-based radar, which provides continuous, weather-independent tracking. Removing Greenland from our missile defense apparatus would shorten response windows and degrade the credibility of U.S. deterrence.

As Arctic sea ice melts, shipping routes are opening at measurable speed. Russia’s Northern Sea Route carried more than 36 million tons of cargo in 2023 — a 700% increase over the past decade. While Greenland does not control that route, it anchors the western Arctic and influences search-and-rescue jurisdiction, maritime surveillance, and access to emerging sea lanes. Any country that shapes Arctic governance will also shape long-term global trade.

China’s involvement in Greenland follows a pattern visible across Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Chinese state-linked firms have pursued mining projects targeting rare earth elements and iron ore. Greenland is estimated to hold roughly 1.5 million tons of rare-earth oxides, materials used in missile guidance systems, radar arrays, electric motors, and advanced electronics.

China already controls approximately 60% of global rare earth production and more than 80% of processing capacity. Any additional leverage over upstream supply deepens an existing U.S. vulnerability.

Russia’s influence operates differently but reaches the same conclusion. Moscow has reopened Soviet-era Arctic bases, deployed advanced air-defense systems, and expanded bomber patrols near Greenland’s airspace. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia now operates more than 50 Arctic military installations.

Greenland does not need to host Russian forces to feel their effects; the surrounding environment determines strategic realities regardless of local preferences.

The question is not whether Greenland will matter in the future. It already does because the Arctic has become a central arena for military positioning, resource competition, and technological supply chains. The real question is whether the United States will treat Greenland as a strategic asset by design or surrender influence through neglect.