The United States Navy has problems maintaining the fleet. Admittedly, it is a challenging task to maintain and repair hundreds of extremely complicated ships, both conventional and nuclear. However, the record in recent years is discouraging.

Beginning in 2016, the Navy decided to invest funds in major overhauls and upgrades to seven selected Ticonderoga-class cruisers. In 2021, VADM James Kilby, then Deputy CNO for warfighting requirements and capabilities, reported to the House of Representatives that $2.8 billion had been spent on the cruisers. Unfortunately, four of the ships, after millions were spent on them, were in such bad shape that they were retired. Three cruisers continue to have work done, but their date of return to the fleet, if ever, is uncertain. Billions have been spent so far over eight years, and there has been no return on this investment.

In October 2021, while operating in the South China Sea, the USS Connecticut (SSN 22) collided at speed with a seamount, causing extensive damage. Fortunately, no lives were lost, but the submarine suffered major damage. The current estimate is that the USS Connecticut will not return to service until early 2026. The cost estimate for the repair is currently $80 million. Due to the lack of repair facilities in the Western Pacific, the sub needed to be returned to the contiguous United States. It is now in the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington. The USS Connecticut was built in six years. Is a four-plus-year repair timeframe reasonable or unusual? Is this due to the unusual amount of damage, the lack of repair capability, or the shortage of workers or key components? The Navy has provided no explanation about the lengthy repair timeline.

According to then-Naval Surface Forces Commander VADM Roy Kitchener, who retired in August 2023, the Navy’s goal is 75 mission-capable, combat-credible ships available. Unfortunately, the Navy is falling short of that goal, as the number of ready ships is in the low 50s and has been for some time. Shortages of manpower and troublesome maintenance backlogs are the causes. A January 2023 report by GAO finds:

From FYs 2011-2021, the 10 Navy ship classes we reviewed faced persistent and worsening challenges, including a decrease in the number of hours a ship is available for operations or training.

These challenges included:

An increase in the number of working ship parts removed and used elsewhere due to parts shortages.
An increase in casualty reports — i.e., reports of events that impair a ship’s ability to do its job.
An increase in maintenance delays.

We have made dozens of recommendations to address these issues, but the Navy has yet to fully implement them all.

The GAO also reported that maintenance costs rose by $1.2 billion from 2011 to 2020.

The Congressional Budget Office studied Navy maintenance requirements and issued its report in 2021. The CBO concluded that fewer skilled workers in Navy maintenance yards is part of the problem. CBO says:

What Causes Delays in Maintenance? Two factors have been the primary causes of delays in the Navy’s shipyards: The amount of maintenance that shipyards must perform in each overhaul has increased, and the Navy has not hired enough new workers to keep pace with the workload. Those factors have increased the number of days nuclear ships spend in the shipyard and the number of days of labor that are required to complete their overhauls. Overhauls have exceeded the number of days of labor scheduled for overhauls by 13 percent to 26 percent, depending on the ship’s class. Maintenance delays have been most acute for attack submarines because those ships are a lower priority at the shipyards than ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carriers. Over the past 12 years, overhauls of attack submarines have typically taken 20 percent to 40 percent longer than planned, both in terms of the number of days of labor required to complete the work and the length of time ships spend in the shipyard.

Despite the increased number of shipyard workers and the anticipated improvements in productivity, CBO projects that the demand for maintenance over the next few decades will exceed the supply of labor in most years. That is because the Navy’s submarines require more days of labor for overhauls than the Navy has planned. As a result, the shipyards will not be able to complete future overhauls on schedule.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported on attack submarine (SSN) availability on February 16, 2024, that the Navy has a goal of no more than 20% in maintenance or idle. The actual figure for the current year is 37%. According to the CRS, the number of SSNs either in depot maintenance or idle (i.e., awaiting depot maintenance) has increased from 10 boats (about 20% of the SSN force) in FY2012 to 18 boats (about 37% of the SSN force) as of May 2023. The data shows:

From FY2015 to FY2023, it shows a decline of 12 SSNs, or 28% fewer available subs.

Conclusion: The Navy is putting fewer ships to sea due to shortages in capacity and manpower to repair its existing ships. When the size of the fleet increases based on planned shipbuilding, we will be increasingly challenged to have ships “ready for sea.” In Part 2, reforms that could be made that would improve this dire situation will be presented.