
Grant for President
For most presidential historians, the period following the Civil War ranks among the most difficult eras in U.S. history.
While Andrew Johnson was pitted against Congress in a battle of wills and power, Ulysses S. Grant was enjoying career success. By 1866, his rank had risen to General of the Armies, a rank not bestowed on any U.S. military leader since George Washington during the American Revolution. While Grant’s skill as a military strategist gave rise to that promotion, he found himself immersed in the political world — caught between the Radical Republicans in Congress and the Democrat commander-in-chief of the military. Grant ultimately raised his voice in favor of the Republic and the people, supporting the legislature created by Article I of the Constitution but disdaining the turmoil caused by the conflict.
It surprised no one attending the 1868 Republican National Convention that Grant won the party’s presidential nomination on the first ballot. Committed to fulfilling Abraham Lincoln’s promises of the Civil War — protection and suffrage for freed former slaves and limiting the power of former Confederate leaders — he defeated the Democrat candidate, Horatio Seymour, by a 3-1 margin and was easily reelected in 1872.
During both terms, Grant set about to fulfill his goals. In 1869, the new president wanted to remain above politics and chose not to use the patronage system that had become an element of successful presidential elections. Instead, he preferred to surround himself with men whose loyalty and judgment he trusted instead of career politicians with decades of previous experience. Some appointments were excellent; others were questionable. From those questionable selections came the charges of corruption that would plague him until his death.
For most presidential historians, the period following the Civil War ranks among the most difficult eras in U.S. history. I often wonder who might have completed Lincoln’s dreams identified in the passage of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments. Legislating the proposed changes was difficult, but enforcing the rights of citizenship and equality for former slaves seemed almost impossible. Southern leaders attempted to negate the new constitutional amendments and regain the power lost as a result of the conflict. Every day brought a challenge to national authority, and Grant — along with the Radical Republican leaders in Congress — was viewed as the enemy of the South, a role he had assumed only a few years earlier as the Union Army commander.
Instead of throwing his hands up in frustration, he attempted to stimulate positive change.
We often forget that the question of who supported racial equality was not answered by the Civil War. The majority of citizens — North and South — did not support equality. Freedom, perhaps, but seldom equality.
So, what was Grant to do?
During his first term, he worked closely with Congress. He urged the passage of the 15th Amendment, which would guarantee the right to vote regardless of race or previous condition of servitude (for males) and proudly signed the legislation in 1870. In short measure, Congress passed a series of Enforcement Acts including the Ku Klux Klan Act, which was designed to counter the violence against black citizens attempting to vote. South Carolina (SURPRISE!) was the most difficult state, and Grant made it the test case for enforcement. In October 1871, he declared martial law in several counties and sent federal troops to enforce the new laws.
Southern leaders were furious. Interestingly, though, congressional leaders often felt he did not do enough to mandate political and social changes in the South. Why? The president struggled with the idea of federalism — that balance of power between the national government and state governments.
That philosophical struggle meant that Grant hesitated to use the full force of the federal government in future areas of resistance: Louisiana, Mississippi, and Georgia. Sometimes he intervened; other times he did not. Support for military occupation diminished, and few Northerners remained excited by Reconstruction policies. The public’s attention span had simply expired. Grant’s dual goals of protecting black citizens and increasing support for the Republican Party slipped away, and economic issues — the Panic of 1873 and its accompanying depression — became front-page news.
While Grant and many other Republicans were conservatives who believed in the gold standard and were fearful of greenbacks, the Union victory had actually increased the value of paper currency while triggering inflation and destabilizing the economy. (Ah, those blasted economic questions…) Two New Yorkers, Jay Gould and James Fisk, stepped forward with a plan to corner the gold market by collaborating with Grant’s brother-in-law.
What was their plan? And how did it create a panic?
- Tags:
- Grassroots
Submit a Comment
To comment about this article, use the social media links above to start a conversation, or use the form below to submit a comment to our editors. We receive hundreds of comments and can only select a few to publish in our Tuesday and Thursday "Reader Comments" sections. Keep it civil, thoughtful, and under 500 characters. (What happened to the old comments forum? See FAQ)