Gen. Colin Powell reports in his autobiography that he “nearly had an aneurism” when Madeline Albright, then the Clinton Administration’s UN ambassador, asked, “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”

There is a mindset among the post-war generations of the Democrat foreign policy elite that has a peripatetic view of military force. This view tempts them into military adventures in which the missions are poorly-defined using tactics that make the stated objectives unachievable. The globe is littered with examples, from Korea and Vietnam to the Balkans to Haiti and, now, to Libya.

Ambassador Albright’s vision of U.S. military power now seems to be playing its second act in the Obama Administration, where military missions in both Afghanistan and Libya are deployed without knowing how “victory” looks, much less how to achieve it. Strategic goals are ill-defined, even convoluted, as are the tactics to achieve them.

In the Libyan operation, for example, we are told, at once, that the objective is humanitarian; to stop the “genocide” of innocent pro-democracy rebels who look curiously like combatants in a Libyan civil war. At the same time that President Obama tells us that Libyan dictator, Muammar Khadafy, “must go,” the Obama Administration says it has ruled out the specific targeting of Khadafy or his family members. Yet the military force we have expended to achieve those stated policy objectives consist only of participating in the NATO-led, UN-authorized enforcement of a “No Fly” zone.

These self-imposed strictures have effectively entrusted American foreign policy objectives to a rag-tag band of rebels whose leadership is unclear and untested and whose “mechanized divisions” consist of Toyota trucks with machine guns lashed to the flatbed. Sending them against Khadafy’s Russian-made T-72 battle tanks, updated just two years ago, is like sending a Cub Scout to box Mike Tyson after he’s trained for a comeback.

Like novice chess players, the amateurs running the Obama White House foreign policy have apparently given no thought to their next moves. If Khadafy surrounds a band of rebels and slaughters them, what then? If Khadafy defeats the rebellion entirely, and remains in power, what then? Do we abandon the stated American objectives and humiliate ourselves in the eyes of our allies and the world, or do we go deeper into the Libyan battle space in what may be a protracted military engagement?

The old wisdom, before the reckless adventurism of the Clinton-Obama crowd, was that Americans went to war only when our vital national interests were at stake. After the Vietnam quagmire, “The Powell Doctrine”, as it came to be known, required a clearly defined objective that could only be achieved by military means; an exit strategy to avoid open-ended commitments; the political support of the American people; and that shots be fired only after all other means of coercion – economic, diplomatic, and political – had been exhausted. Moreover, at least before the Iraq War, doctrine had been that Americans would use overwhelming force to counter military adversaries so that victory was swift, decisive and complete.

In the Libyan intervention, we have abandoned the basic notion of fighting only when America’s “vital interests” are at stake as well as the Powell Doctrine and the doctrine of overwhelming force.

I make no determination here as to whether the Libyan intervention is in America’s vital interest, though I doubt it. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said it is not, but his commentary was quickly revised by Secretary of State Clinton. I would not presume to have better information than the two who are closest to the table of decision making. They may have had good reason for our intervention.

A prolonged civil war in Libya – the “genocide” the Obama Administration has alleged – might endanger Europe because Libyan refugees would likely emigrate to Italy and France. French suburban governments are already reeling from Arab immigration and the French rightist, anti-Muslim party did far better in local elections in recent week than had been anticipated. There is fear among some in France that additional immigration of Arab Muslims, from Libya, Algeria and elsewhere in Africa into metropolitan France might forever alter the character of traditionally Western, Christian, Gallic France. Italy is similarly struggling, with riots there among Arab Muslims early last year and ongoing Muslim challenges to the traditionally Catholic culture of the country. In Germany, too, Arab immigration is playing a role in national politics and culture, and kindling the rise of angry, nationalist, and even underground neo-Nazi operatives.

It is also possible that there are additional oil reserves in Libya that are not publicly known and which US policymakers hope to exploit. Britain’s scheming to release the bomber of Pan Am Flight 103, in which 189 Americans and 43 Britons were killed, for purportedly “humanitarian” reasons, was reportedly driven by British oil interests. A large North African oil reserve in a nation friendly to the United States would certainly serve American interests.

But even if one was to presume that the Libyan action was motivated to defend or enhance vital American interests like the stability of Europe or a large oil supply, the tactics used to carry out the mission are inappropriate. If the goals we hope to achieve by military means are (1) to protect Libyan rebels from annihilation by their own government; and (2) to secure the removal of Muammar Khadafy, we are going about it by the wrong means.

First, it should be abundantly clear that Muammar Khadafy must be on a list of Libyans to be killed, along with his sons. That can be done covertly, accidentally or as a stated mission of our forces. Khadafy has been deeply involved in terrorism since at least the days of the 1972 Olympic Village massacre. His hiatus from terrorism since the commencement of the Iraq War is probably at its end, now that he is again in conflict with the US and the West. Even if he flees Libya, he will have billions of dollars to feed terrorist networks and doubtlessly will. He should be as much a target for assassination as Osama Bin Laden.

It should also be clear that the mission of protecting the Libyan rebels from Khadafy’s forces cannot be achieved simply by imposing a no-fly zone or even by targeting loyalist Khadafy forces in the midst of their attacks upon Libyan rebels. Khadafy’s forces have attacked the rebels with Toyota trucks that are indistinguishable from the air from those used by the rebels. From these camouflaged forward positions, Khadafy loyalists can call in artillery strikes on the rebels or mass armor units into a forward blitzkrieg assault on precisely targeted rebel units.

Likewise, it should be clear that the Obama Administration’s discussions of “arming the rebels” comes with the implicit requirement that American advisors be inserted among the rebels to teach them how to use the weaponry we would provide or removing some of the rebels from the theatre to be trained at our bases. That will take time and would implicate the United States more directly in the conflict. There should be some consensus on policy, though, before we take that step.

Last, if the rebels are to succeed in capturing Tripoli, American or NATO forces, or perhaps some private contractor, must provide a sustainable line of supply and reinforcement from Benghazi on the road to Tripoli. In their previous offensives, the rebels have brought their forces forward, only to be forced to retreat back to Benghazi because they cannot supply a forward advance. Base camps West of Benghazi could be supplied from the sea, but there must be a willingness to do so and absolute control of the skies as the supplies are ferried ashore.

The mission the president and Secretary Clinton have defined cannot be accomplished using the forces currently devoted to achieve it. Indeed, the current tactical mix will only cause the conflict to be protracted, increase the level of rebel casualties and produce no clear winner on either side. It not only fails to advance America’s stated policy objectives, it actually exacerbates them by prolonging the war and further empowering Khadafy among the mercenaries he has paid to fight.

Waging war from off-shore using only destroyers, cruisers, helicopter assault vessels, and land-based NATO air forces is insufficient. If the rebels are to be saved, and Khadafy and his sons are to be killed, coordinated airstrikes must be launched by carrier-based aircraft from off the coast of Tripoli and there must be sufficient combat air patrol South and West of the Gulf of Sidra to allow rebel forces to hold territory and supply their advance. That would likely involve at least one carrier battle group (preferably two) and round-the-clock sorties for upwards of three to six months, depending on the efficacy of the rebels in capturing Tripoli and ousting Khadafy’s loyalists. If they fail, we would either have to withdraw from the theatre, leaving the country divided, or decide to capture Tripoli with American and allied forces.

Of course, with the United States already fighting two wars and facing staggering deficits, there is little support or will to act in any of these decidedly more belligerent fashions. But that is the lesson: American policy makers should never write foreign policy checks our resources – and our will – are not prepared to cover. Barack Obama’s inexperience and naivete – compounded by that of Hillary Clinton – have brought Americans to a place where we need to either conduct robust military operations or to be humiliated in the eyes of the world by a belligerent, intransigent, dangerous dictator who will capitalize on his “victory” to further advance his power and prestige among the Arab world.

American prestige and credibility are now on the line, thanks to Obama’s team of amateurs; there is no stepping back. But Americans can insist that the mission be accomplished quickly, decisively, and without prolonged involvement, or a dangerous aftermath.

We should all insist that the president end this fiasco, quickly. Then, we should hire a competent Commander-in-Chief for 2012.

J.G. Collins writes from New York City. His writings have previously appeared in The American Conservative.