In chapter 14 of Luke’s Gospel, Jesus explains to the multitude that there is a cost to being His disciple. He warns them to count the cost, so they don’t fall short and turn back when it gets tough.

One of the examples Jesus provided was a king going to war: “What king, going to make war against another king, does not sit down first and consider whether he is able with ten thousand to meet him who comes against him with twenty thousand? Or else, while the other is still a great way off, he sends a delegation and asks conditions of peace.”

That principle came to mind as I followed the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran, because the central question before America today is not whether we desire peace, but whether the peace being negotiated achieves the objective for which military force was used in the first place.

For the record, I supported President Trump’s decisive action toward Iran. Operation Midnight Hammer was decisive, but subsequent intelligence reports revealed that while the strikes significantly set back Iran’s nuclear program, they did not destroy it. In fact, reports indicated Iran was already rebuilding and hardening portions of its nuclear infrastructure.

President Trump has repeatedly stated that Iran cannot be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon. Yet the ongoing negotiations have produced no indication that Tehran is willing to abandon its nuclear ambitions. In fact, Iranian officials have repeatedly declared that retaining the ability to enrich uranium — and to possess enriched uranium — remains a non-negotiable red line.

The opposite side of Iran’s red line must remain a red line for the United States, as history suggests that when red lines become negotiable, they become greenlights for aggression by adversaries. 

Anything short of an Iran that is no longer a nuclear-threshold state would raise serious questions about whether the objective that justified Operation Epic Fury has actually been achieved.

For more than two decades, Iran has mastered not the art of the deal but the art of delay.

From the European negotiations in 2003, to the P5+1 talks, to the JCPOA and its aftermath, the pattern has remained remarkably consistent: Iran negotiates, delays, preserves its options, and then continues pursuing its strategic objectives. 

Peace agreements generally hinge on three conditions: first, both sides conclude that continued fighting will not improve their position; second, the disputed objective becomes more expensive to pursue than to compromise on; and third, political leaders can successfully sell the outcome at home.

That brings us to the central questions.

Can America, Israel, and the broader international community live with an Iran that remains a nuclear-threshold state?

Can the United States improve its position through renewed military action against the Islamist regime?

Can President Trump sell an agreement that falls short of the stated objective behind Operation Epic Fury?

Jesus warned that no king should enter a conflict without first counting the cost. The same principle applies to nations. Before declaring victory or securing peace, America must determine whether the objective that justified that cost has actually been achieved. The challenge is not simply securing peace, but securing a peace that permanently removes Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon. Getting this wrong could leave future generations confronting an even more dangerous threat under far less favorable circumstances.

This article originally appeared here.