As far as wars go, our conflict with Iran has been remarkably brief — 40 days of active hostilities, followed by a several-month quasi-ceasefire phase, and now the beginning of peace negotiations. But it’s been a confusing jumble. Along with the usual “fog of war,” we’ve experienced our share of “fog of semi-peace fire” and now “fog of peace” — with all three fogs reaching Nantucket pea soup grade.

Accounts of the ongoing conflict with Iran have been regularly complicated by contradictory statements issued from our side compared to those from the Iranians, uncertainty even about who speaks for Iran these days, par-for-the-course bluster from President Donald Trump, and the ever-present barrage of criticism here at home from Trump’s political opponents.

But when you get right down to it, it’s not that mysterious. Surely we can cut through the fog on the central points, as follows:

1.) First, a perspective on the war as a whole. While for months, Trump’s critics have been fuming about his “war of choice,” declaring it to be illegal, immoral, Hitler-ish, etc., we now hear squeals of outrage from many of those same critics who judge that the president’s recently announced 14-point memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Iran is far too lenient. Suddenly, they’ve sprouted hawk wings and demand that he “finish the job.”

Evidently, it is now becoming clear to all that Iran is a powerful, ruthless, and very dangerous enemy, a regime that has little concern about the well-being of its own citizens, is relatively unfazed by its beatdown by U.S. forces, could not care less about world order, and remains dedicated to its underlying “Death to America” mission.

In my view, the overnight change of tune from the Left actually reveals a remarkable, albeit unstated truth: that we must not allow this rogue nation to acquire nuclear weapons. Perhaps those who just a few months ago argued that our president should have stayed at home and stuck to his knitting (i.e., “working on the things that matter to Americans”) now recognize that ignoring the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran would have exposed our nation — and the world — to great peril.

2.) Simultaneously, the emerging center of concern is Iran’s stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz, adversely affecting the entire world economy and widely viewed as Iran’s ace in the hole in the ongoing peace negotiations. In fact, the MOU as written seems to imply that if Iran opens the Strait to sea traffic with no tolls during the 60-day negotiating period, thereafter Iran would be free to exercise whatever controls it chose.

I don’t see it that way, for the simple reason that the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway. Regardless of the MOU’s wording, the Strait is not Iran’s to control, and its access and use are not subjects of negotiation.

There’s nothing ambiguous about the word “international.” True, by virtue of the Strait’s geographic location — it’s Iran’s front porch — Iran has the tactical ability to control sea traffic through it. But it has no more right to do so than the U.S. would have to decide which ships can cross the Atlantic Ocean. And the international community has every right to prevent, with force if needed, any actions by Iran now or in the future to dictate who uses the Strait or extract tolls for passage.

The matter is non-negotiable and must be clarified in the upcoming peace negotiations.

3.) As the MOU was taking shape, we heard again and again that the U.S./Iran peace agreement would be like JCPOA 2.0, no better and quite possibly weaker than the 2015 agreement negotiated by Barack Obama and John Kerry. That’s not true.

The JCPOA that President Trump abandoned during his first presidential term had two fatal flaws.

• It did not prevent a nuclear-armed Iran; it just postponed it. The JCPOA had built-in sunset provisions, over an eight- to 15-year period, after which Iran would be subject only to the restrictions already accepted by worldwide signatories to established nuclear non-proliferation agreements. The underlying premise of the JCPOA was that in those intervening 15 years, Iran would become a responsible member of the international community. Now we know better. The entire world has watched Iran go in exactly the opposite direction, becoming the world’s leading broker of international terrorism.

• The JCPOA included oversight and control provisions, by which participating nations could identify and act on any Iranian noncompliance. But those controls were effectively abrogated to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were not rigorously enforced, and are now known to have been ineffective.

4.) Trump critics also maintain that Iran, having been pummeled by the U.S., is somehow now in a better position than before Operation Epic Fury. Hmm, let’s see: Iran’s navy no longer has ships, its air force is down to flying drones, its national economy is in shambles, oil production is down to a trickle, and the regime’s leaders are hiding in bunkers.

As noted above, Iran’s geographic proximity to the Strait of Hormuz gives it the opportunity to illegally control sea traffic — but no more so than before the war. And it is true that Iran’s resilience is remarkable. But basically, its leaders are hanging on by their fingernails.

And what about the already-infamous 14-point MOU and the upcoming negotiation period? Are they also clouded by the pea soup fog?

There’s plenty not to like about the MOU as written, and the heaps of criticism from both Left and Right have merit. But it’s worth keeping in mind that the MOU is certainly not a “deal” by any definition, even if the president likes to call it that. More accurately, it’s an agreement to stop fighting while both sides make a serious effort to craft a deal that might really work.

The MOU reads like an invitation to a Christmas season open house, not to be missed, with treats for all. But for the most part, its actual words fall well short of hard promises by the U.S. to give those goodies away; on five of the 14 points, the U.S. agrees to “undertake” various efforts to do various things; I think it’s fair to interpret that word as to mean get started, give it try, but with eyes open at every step, ready to put on the brakes as needed.

Most worrisome about the MOU is what’s not in it. It says nothing at all about Iran’s missile program and its funding of terrorism by proxies, two areas that must be central to any final peace agreement. On Iran’s supposed commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, the MOU language is far too ambivalent; while it states specifically that Iran “will not procure or develop” nuclear weapons (point eight), but that point also indicates that the U.S. and Iran will “discuss enrichment” (what’s to discuss?); and it also (point nine) states that the U.S. will not disturb the “status quo” of Iran’s nuclear program.

Moreover, despite the insistence by President Trump and VP JD Vance that all MOU provisions are contingent upon Iran’s upholding its part of the deal, the MOU offers no specifics regarding what actions or omissions by Iran would trigger American countermeasures, including a possible return to hostilities. Those must be defined.

Going forward, it will be important for the U.S. negotiators to keep in mind what we’ve learned about our Iranian foes over the past four months — that they care primarily about money and commerce, and very little about the well-being of their own citizens.

Recall that several months ago, the president was ready to proceed with our planned actions to obliterate Iranian bridges and power plants. I suspect that he chose not to go down that path because he recognized that doing so would make life even more miserable for Iranian citizens, but that the regime would remain as obstinate as ever. Whether for humanitarian or tactical reasons (or both), Trump’s decision to hold fire at that point was the right call.

And with that in mind, our negotiation posture should allow financial rewards to be released to Iran only sparingly, and only if sea traffic is moving freely in the Strait, with U.S. forces poised and ready to reinstate the blockade on a moment’s notice.

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The ultimate question for the president, his negotiating team, and all Americans: Is it even possible to reach a functional peace treaty with a nation that has shown us again and again that it cannot be trusted?

Perhaps the best answer is in Teddy Roosevelt’s advice more than a century ago: “Walk softly, but carry a big stick.” A successful resolution of our conflict with Iran is in our nation’s best interest and is potentially an enormous benefit to the world. Yet we must proceed with eyes wide open, warily, implementing it in good faith but ready to set it aside and revert to force once again, if necessary.