In Brief: Afghanistan One Year Later
The least we owe the victims of Joe Biden’s blundering is some lessons learned.
On August 30, 2021, the last U.S. troops were removed from Afghanistan. Joe Biden’s disgraceful and disastrous surrender of the country to the Taliban will have lasting consequences. A man who lost an eye there, former Navy SEAL and current U.S. Congressman Dan Crenshaw, weighs in on the lessons that should be learned. He begins by saying the first challenge is that “"there has to be some agreement on what the desired outcome was to begin with.”
One of the reasons there will never be “lessons learned” for Afghanistan is because different factions had different outcomes in mind. The national security hawks wanted to prevent the return of a strong and capable Al Qaeda and Islamic State, or a Taliban who would harbor them. We wanted a strategic forward presence and capable partners on whom we could rely. But the isolationists (or populists, or liberals, or “no more endless wars” sloganeers, whatever you want to call them), never gravitated towards any of that. This group places moral value on keeping our military locked up behind tempered glass ready to “break in case of emergency.” And the Democrats? I can’t figure out what they really wanted and neither can they.
Maybe one thing all sides agreed on was this: Someone screwed up, and his name rhymes with Joe Biden. He refused to listen to the advice of his Secretary of Defense or his generals. He wanted “zero” troops and that meant leaving a defensible Bagram Air Base deserted. He wanted to “make good” on a vapid campaign slogan to “end the endless wars” and nothing was going to get in his way — not common sense, not reality on the ground, no national security considerations beyond his presidency. But Biden didn’t arrive at this point in a vacuum. His decision was the product of a long series of bipartisan narratives and slogans soaked in half-truths and emotional appeals.
Crenshaw comes up with three lessons to be learned:
The first lesson is leadership. I’ve seen plenty of social media famous know-it-alls castigate broadly “the generals” or the “military industrial complex” as a convenient scapegoat for the prolonged conflict.
Some blame lies there, to be sure, but in the end, the answer was far simpler than that: politicians. For 20 years, politicians failed to articulate what our mission was. You see, we faced two simple choices in 2001: take revenge or prevent another attack.
We chose to do both (a perfectly rational decision, whether you agree or not), but only articulated the revenge part to the American people and then wondered why they grew impatient after years of military occupation. To say the complicated reality could have been explained better is an understatement.
The second lesson is how to control our emotions. The decision to rapidly withdraw from Afghanistan after 20 years of hard-fought gains was a purely emotional one, a product of strategic misunderstanding (see lesson one) that led to fatigue and frustration. Had we used our heads, we may have done a quick cost/benefit analysis and discovered that after 20 years we were finally in a decent balance, wherein our goal of prevention was being accomplished at relatively little cost in terms of lives (no combat deaths in well over a year before the withdrawal) and resources.
And that leads to the third lesson: seek balance. There isn’t a perfect model for foreign interventions, declaring war, or determining when America’s interests are truly threatened or not. But the last 20 years in Iraq and Afghanistan gave us some hints, where we convulsed between surges and withdrawals and nation building and MOABs (Mother of All Bombs). And what did we discover?
“Slogan shouldn’t dictate policy,” Crenshaw argues. The problem is that they too often do. The result, he concludes, is not good:
If we continue to prove that we don’t have the stomach for the world’s chaos and unpredictability, and react by throwing our hands up and turning inward, then we ought to prepare ourselves for a far more dangerous world — one run by war lords with nuclear weapons. …
We ran away from Afghanistan because it was messy and inconvenient, and politicians thought the American people were too simple to hear tough truths. The Afghan people paid the price, as did thousands of American Gold Star families who now wonder what their sacrifice ever meant. The least we owe them is some lessons learned.
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