Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 34 — 1788
Category: National Defense
To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity would be to calculate on the weaker springs of human character.
Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist, no 71
Category: Political Leaders
When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.
Alexander Hamilton
Essay in the American Daily Advertiser — 1794
Category: Constitution
If it be asked, What is the most sacred duty and the greatest source of our security in a Republic? The answer would be, An inviolable respect for the Constitution and Laws - the first growing out of the last. . . . A sacred respect for the constitutional law is the vital principle, the sustaining energy of a free government.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 9 — 1787
Category: Republican Government
The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election... They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican govenrment may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 9 — 1787
Category: Federalism
The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 11 — 1787
Category: International Relations
The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 11 — 1787
Category: International Relations
Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 12 — 1787
Category: Taxation
It is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 15 — 1787
Category: International Relations
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 15 — 1787
Category: Power
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 17 — 1787
Category: Federalism
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the State governments... --I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 21 — 1787
Category: Political Leaders
The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or representative constitution, is a change of men.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 21 — 1787
Category: Taxation
If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 25 — 1787
Category: International Relations
War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perserverance, by time, and by practice.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 32 — 1788
Category: Federalism
But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 31 — 1788
Category: Power
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects commmitted to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 33 — 1788
Category: Tyranny
If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 33 — 1788
Category: Law
The propriety of a law, in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is founded.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 34 — 1788
Category: Constitution
Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in the national government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities.
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
Federalist No. 55 — 1788
Category: House of Representatives
In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. ... Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
Federalist No. 55 — 1788
Category: Human Nature
Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be, that there is not sufficient virture among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
Federalist No. 57 — 1788
Category: Constitution
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virture to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
Federalist No. 62 — 1788
Category: Law
Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
Federalist No. 62 — 1788
Category: Government
No government, any more than an individual, will long be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and stability.
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
Federalist No. 63 — 1788
Category: Power
Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party, and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents.