There’s a lot of speculation surrounding Chinese President Xi Jinping’s latest and most dramatic disposal of a key general. Is Xi feeling that his power is threatened and is therefore consolidating it? Is Xi using the narrative of “combating corruption” to get rid of those who disagree with his plans to attack Taiwan, or did these generals actually sell secrets to the U.S.? China’s intentional opacity makes it difficult to determine exactly what happened, but the “simple” answer is probably all of the above, and it may have implications for U.S. national security.

Since 2022, Xi has been purging the top brass of his Central Military Commission, China’s top military decision-making body. The current term began with six members and is now down to one active uniformed officer, General Zhang Shengmin, who was promoted to vice chairman after Xi removed the previous one. It will be interesting to see how long Zhang lasts. Following hard upon Liu Zhenli’s downfall came the announcement of an investigation and removal of General Zhang Youxia, Xi’s most trusted military ally, due to corruption charges.

Christopher Johnson, head of China Strategies Group, a political-risk consulting firm, noted, “This move is unprecedented in the history of the Chinese military and represents the total annihilation of the high command.”

According to The Wall Street Journal, “China’s senior-most general is accused of leaking information about the country’s nuclear-weapons program to the U.S. and accepting bribes for official acts, including the promotion of an officer to defense minister.”

There are also allegations of “forming political cliques” to undermine party unity, which is a sign of disloyalty to Xi, and if history has taught us anything, it’s that dictators despise anyone who dares to double-cross them.

Some, like Asia Society Policy Institute senior fellow Lyle Morris, suggest that General Zhang had too much power “outside of Xi himself.” Morris explained that Xi, as CMC chairman, has the ultimate authority over China’s military, “so, highlighting such a violation suggests that Zhang was out of step with Xi’s chain of command” and that he “is confident in his consolidation of power over the military.”

Why does this matter for America?

Analysts disagree on whether this move will increase or decrease the probability of China invading Taiwan in 2027. Some argue that hollowing out top leadership will affect combat effectiveness and readiness. The Journal reports, “Since the summer of 2023, the party has unseated top officers in China’s army, air force, navy, strategic-missile force, and paramilitary police, as well as major theater commands — including the one focused on Taiwan.” Removing more than 50 senior military officers in just two and a half years could definitely impact combat readiness.

However, Jianli Yang, founder and president of Citizen Power Initiatives, believes otherwise, arguing that this recent purge brings Xi a step closer to his goal. It “does not push conflict farther away,” he says. “It tightens Xi’s personal control over the gun, removes whatever moderating influence might have existed inside the top command, and elevates precisely the kind of younger, more ideological, and more risk-prone officer corps Xi is likely to rely on if he decides that the ‘opportunity window’ for Taiwan is opening rather than closing.” Yang believes that these top generals, who were at the height of their careers and were striving to retire safely, didn’t fall because they were trying to overthrow Xi, but because they disagreed with him on Taiwan.

Zhang possibly made the false assumption that, because of their family’s long history and ties, he could differ from Xi without consequences. Along with Xi, Zhang is considered a “princeling” in China because his father, Zhang Zongxun, was a founding general of the People’s Republic of China. Yang further details, “Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was a political partner of Zhang Zongxun during the CCP revolution; the families maintained long-standing ties. Zhang is not merely an appointee; he is a childhood associate.” As a result, when Xi took power, he elevated Zhang and kept him on even after he reached his seventies.

If the whole reason for this is Taiwan, as Yang stipulates, then Xi will begin appointing younger officers who have a different ideological profile of China and war from their older predecessors — one steeped in “the East rises, and the West declines.” They may also be more willing to affirm Xi and tell him what he wants to hear in order to get promoted and advance in their military careers.

The Washington Post promotes this possibility, writing, “Analysts say older-generation PLA [People’s Liberation Army] leaders have historically served as a moderating force within military decision-making. ‘I think these old guards are much more reluctant to attack Taiwan,’ said Sun of the Stimson Center. ‘Xi wants his own people; he wants younger people that will, in a way, be more beholden to him.’”

These disciplinary purges are not confined to the military; they are being performed across the Chinese government.

According to official statistics, 980,000 officials were punished last year. Perhaps Xi was trying to protect his long-time friend from his “anti-corruption campaign” for as long as he could, or maybe his ally got too big for his britches and didn’t affirm Xi’s desire to acquire Taiwan. Regardless of the reason, Xi demonstrated dominance, and his power now rivals that of Mao.