I support President Donald Trump’s tariff strategy. I believe tariffs are a necessary tool to reduce the United States’ massive goods trade deficit, which has hovered around $1.2 trillion annually, and to apply pressure on adversaries such as China. I also recognize the severity of the fentanyl crisis, which has killed tens of thousands of Americans each year and represents a legitimate national emergency. None of that changes the constitutional analysis.

The Supreme Court’s recent ruling on tariffs was not a referendum on trade policy. Rather, it was a structural decision about the separation of powers.

The Trump administration relied on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a 1977 statute that allows the president to respond to “unusual and extraordinary threats” to national security, foreign policy, or the U.S. economy after declaring a national emergency. Under IEEPA, the president may investigate, block, regulate, and prohibit certain economic transactions. The administration argued that the fentanyl crisis and the persistent trade imbalance qualified as national emergencies, and that tariffs fell within the statute’s authority to “regulate” importation.

The Court did not dispute that fentanyl is a crisis. The Court did not dispute that trade deficits present economic concerns. The question was narrower: Did Congress clearly authorize the president to impose broad, enduring tariffs under IEEPA?

The majority held that it did not.

The Constitution assigns the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” to Congress. Tariffs are taxes on imported goods. While Congress may delegate aspects of trade authority to the executive branch, major economic powers require explicit statutory language. When Congress intends to transfer tariff authority, it does so clearly and with defined limits.

IEEPA authorizes regulation and even embargo-like restrictions. It does not explicitly authorize sweeping tariffs of the magnitude imposed here. In the nearly five decades since IEEPA’s enactment, no president had used it to implement a broad tariff regime. That absence of historical practice reinforced the Court’s conclusion that such authority was never clearly delegated.

This is a straightforward textual principle. Regulation does not automatically mean taxation. If the word “regulate” were interpreted to include open-ended tariff authority, the executive branch would effectively possess unilateral taxing power during any declared emergency. That reading would dramatically expand presidential authority beyond constitutional design.

The implications become clearer when applying a neutral test. Imagine a Democrat administration declaring a climate emergency and imposing nationwide tariffs on gasoline-powered vehicles or domestic energy imports under IEEPA. Conservatives would immediately argue that such unilateral taxation violates Article I of the Constitution. Constitutional principles cannot depend on partisan preference. The scope of executive power must remain consistent regardless of which party occupies the White House.

The Court’s ruling does not eliminate tariffs as a policy tool. Congress retains the authority to explicitly delegate tariff power. Existing statutes, such as Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act and Section 301 of the Trade Act, provide targeted mechanisms for trade enforcement. The decision simply states that IEEPA, as currently written, does not provide unlimited tariff authority.

From a policy standpoint, tariffs have produced measurable leverage, particularly in reducing the U.S. trade deficit with China compared with prior decades. Democrats who claim tariffs are inherently destructive ignore evidence that strategic trade enforcement can reshape supply chains and alter negotiations. However, policy success does not override constitutional limits.

The separation of powers exists to prevent the concentration of authority. Congress writes the tax laws, and the executive enforces them. The judiciary ensures that enforcement remains within statutory boundaries. Supporting tariffs while acknowledging constitutional constraints is not contradictory; it reflects respect for the structure that protects representative government.

If broader tariff authority is necessary to address trade imbalances or combat fentanyl trafficking, Congress should legislate clearly. Expanding executive power through creative statutory interpretation is not the solution.