Will President Donald Trump’s war against Iran, undertaken in alignment with Israel, prove to be an electoral albatross for Republicans in November? Could Democrats, salivating at the prospect of impeaching and removing Trump from office in 2027, regain control of the House and Senate, fueled by the political repercussions of this war?

Political clairvoyance is a rara avis. But the odds appear unfavorable to Trump and the Republican Party.

Consider first the price of energy, including gasoline at the pump. A significant portion of the world’s oil and gas supply passes through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow gateway to and from the Persian Gulf. The risk that Iran could close the strait to inflict global economic damage and pressure the United States to end the war has already pushed international oil prices upward. If the conflict endures, gasoline prices could surge dramatically by Election Day. Electricity costs would follow. Inflation would rise further, compounded by tariffs imposed under expanded authorities after the administration’s loss before the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

At present, there is no clear light at the end of the tunnel. Trump has spoken of four to six weeks and even the possibility of boots on the ground. Haven’t we heard that tune before? The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban was expected to last months. Instead, it produced 20 years of costly futility that ended in 2021.

Mission creep, reminiscent of Vietnam, seems a real possibility. There is no clear definition of victory and no articulated endgame. Eliminating Iran’s leadership would no more transform the country into a fledgling democracy than eliminating the leadership of drug cartels has turned them into philanthropies. As Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote in “On War,” “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” If an attack lacks a political objective, it risks becoming little more than violence without purpose. Military history repeatedly teaches that body counts alone do not secure victory.

Iran itself is not easily dismissed. It has not invaded another country for more than two centuries, and its internal political tensions already constrain external adventurism. Yet nationalism remains powerful. Iran demonstrated this during the Iran-Iraq War beginning in 1980, when Saddam Hussein assumed Iran would collapse quickly. Instead, the Iranians fought Iraq to a brutal stalemate, enduring chemical weapons and missile attacks on their cities.

Unlike many neighboring states carved from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, Iran is an ancient and cohesive civilization. Its people take pride in figures such as Cyrus the Great and in the literary heritage of Omar Khayyam’s Rubaiyat. At the same time, many Iranians remain deeply skeptical of American intentions. They remember that in 1953 the United States helped topple Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh after he nationalized the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In his place, Washington supported Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whose regime relied on the feared SAVAK security apparatus.

Whether accurate or not, some observers perceive the United States as acting less in its own strategic interest than in support of the fragile political standing of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The conflict has already divided segments of Trump’s own MAGA coalition, many of whom oppose the United States repeatedly searching abroad for enemies to destroy. “Israel First,” they argue, cannot become a substitute for “America First.”

Meanwhile, global strategic consequences loom. If the United States becomes deeply entangled in Iran, China may be emboldened to act more aggressively toward Taiwan. As Stephen Miller recently remarked, the world is ultimately governed by strength and power. But that raises an unavoidable question: Would the United States risk a war with China and the possibility of nuclear escalation to defend Taiwan?

History often teaches that restraint can be the wisest course. In foreign policy, what diplomats once called “masterly inactivity” is sometimes the most prudent strategy of all.

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